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Negotiation Skills for Post-Confl ict Actors 
was held May 20-23, 2007, at the Marina 
Dunes Resort in Marina, California. 
Representatives from non-governmental 
organizations, intergovernmental 
organizations, government civilian agencies, 
and the US and foreign armed forces 
gathered to discuss negotiation principles, 
improve their cross-community and inter-
organizational communication skills, network 
with practitioners from the fi eld, and learn 
best practices from experts. The event was 
hosted by the Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies and was cosponsored 
by the United States Institute of Peace, 
drawing from their successful curriculum 
on negotiation issues.
About This Event
The Center for Stabilization 
and Reconstruction Studies 
(CSRS) is a teaching institute 
which develops and hosts 
educational programs for stabilization 
and reconstruction practitioners operating 
around the globe. Established by the Naval 
Postgraduate School in 2004 through 
the vision and congressional support of 
Congressman Sam Farr (CA-17), CSRS 
creates a wide array of programs to foster 
dialogue among practitioners, as well as help 
them develop new strategies and refi ne best 
practices to improve the effectiveness of 
their important global work.
Located at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, CSRS also contributes 
to the university’s research and graduate 
degree programs. For more information 
about CSRS, its philosophy, and programs, 
please visit www.nps.edu/csrs. 
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As relief actors enter post-confl ict environments, 
they are increasingly working in countries 
torn by civil war. Many of the conditions 
that originally led to confl ict – ethnic strife, 
corruption, and power and resource inequities 
among them – remain. As a consequence, peace 
is often tenuous and nearly half of all states 
that have experienced civil war will return 
to it within fi ve years.1  Thus, relief actors 
must maintain vigilance in the fi eld, balancing 
security concerns with their need to deliver vital 
services to victims of confl ict. 
The fl uid nature of these environments 
–  with their variable security conditions, 
stakeholders, and relief needs –  can challenge 
even the most fl exible of actors. Additionally, 
many are ill-equipped to do the sophisticated 
information gathering, synthesis, and sharing 
now necessitated in post-confl ict relief work. 
Factors such as organizational mandates or 
values, budget constraints, and operational 
processes can further constrain actors’ efforts, 
making it diffi cult to meet the full range of 
local needs. 
The changing role of the military also adds 
complexity to fi eld work, as armed forces 
perform services that have traditionally been 
the province of humanitarian organizations. 
Since the military lacks the extensive fi eld 
knowledge, long-term relationships, and relief 
response expertise that non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) possess, local 
commanders often want to partner with these 
groups to improve their effectiveness and win 
the hearts and minds of the local populace.  
The military’s increased role has caused great 
concern to many members of the NGO and 
IGO communities, as these groups fear that 
their missions are being infringed upon, their 
neutrality and independence compromised, 
and their security threatened by the military’s 
presence. This role overlap, or “creep,” can 
also cause confusion on the ground, as local 
populations struggle to differentiate players 
and view humanitarian relief providers with 
increased suspicion. Does such a thing as 
humanitarian space exist any longer, if it is 
now occupied by military personnel? And is 
it even realistic to expect such a separation, 
when security issues are increasingly forcing 
NGO and IGO personnel to cooperate and 
share the same space with military forces? 
1
The fl uid nature of post-confl ict environments and their changing security 
conditions are forcing relief actors to work more closely together in the fi eld. 
Negotiation skills can help actors illuminate parties’ needs, delineate common 
ground, develop creative options, and work towards successful outcomes. 
Executive Summary
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While industry thinkers acknowledge that 
actors’ missions vary considerably, they state 
that cooperation is inevitable. “Some degree of 
cooperative involvement in training, planning, 
and information exchange is critical as a 
means of avoiding misunderstandings and 
dealing with institutional prejudices,” says H. 
Roy Williams of the Center for Humanitarian 
Cooperation.2 Meanwhile, a report by the US 
Institute of Peace warns that: “The problems 
created by a lack of information sharing in 
crisis conditions cannot be overstated.” 3 
Consequently, communication should fl ow 
continually on multiple different dimensions: 
within, between, and among organizations; 
with local leaders; with and between decision 
makers; with the media; and among the parties 
in the confl ict to ensure that all parties are 
working effectively and securely in the fi eld.4
While not all relief actors are happy about the 
changes of recent years, many see the value of 
working more closely with critical stakeholders 
to improve security and the effectiveness of 
relief response. As practitioners seek to bridge 
cultural divides and resolve issues in the 
fi eld, negotiation skills can be critical. Skilled 
negotiators can illuminate parties’ needs, 
delineate common ground, develop creative 
options, and help groups achieve successful 
outcomes. Sometimes individuals negotiate 
with other relief actors, seeking to clarify roles 
and responsibilities. Other times they negotiate 
with a wide array of players, including host 
governments, civil society, or rebel factions, 
seeking to avert or minimize crises and prevent 
states from failing. On still other occasions, 
they may serve as on-the-ground mediators, 
helping relief workers or local community 
members resolve confl icts, potentially 
preventing issues from escalating into ethnic 
skirmishes or civil war. 
Often such negotiations or mediations are 
informal and ad hoc, resulting from the 
various actors’ efforts to conduct relief or 
other activities in local communities. They 
may also be ongoing, as actors negotiate the 
terms of their service to validate the role of 
local leadership, ensure that work meets with 
community acceptance, and gain access to 
new service populations. Changing political 
dynamics, security concerns, health issues, 
and refugee concerns can add complexity 
and urgency to multiparty negotiations, 
requiring that negotiators and third parties 
Targeted 
Education 
for the Relief 
Community
Established in 2004, the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Studies (CSRS) offers educational programs for relief practitioners on 
a wide array of topics, including:
•  Health and humanitarian affairs.
•  Institution building and security sector reform.
•  Stabilization and reconstruction skills and tools.
•  Maritime and naval issues.
•  Center for Humanitarian 
Cooperation  
•  Global Majority   
• International Medical Corps  
 •  International Organization 
for Migration   
•  International Rescue Committee   
•  Different ofﬁ ces of the 
US Department of Defense, 
US Department of State, 
and US Navy   
•  Various educational institutions
CSRS often partners with other organizations to design highly relevant, hands-on curricula that will assist 
participants in developing the insights, skills, and networks they need to increase their effectiveness. 
Past partners have included:
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use skill, sensitivity, and fl exibility to resolve 
escalating disputes. Savvy negotiators will seek 
to negotiate interests, rather than positions, 
to create “win-win” results. In Getting to 
Yes, authors Roger Fisher and William Ury 
illustrate the danger of positional bargaining 
with an anecdote about how Kennedy-era 
talks between the Soviet Union and the United 
States broke down over nuclear inspections 
negotiations. The United States wanted ten, 
while the Soviet Union would cede only three. 
The irony? Neither side had bothered to defi ne 
what an inspection constituted, meaning that 
the discussions were totally meaningless.5   
Negotiators are infl uenced by a wide array 
of factors. (See graphic box above.) While 
negotiators typically operate within a sphere 
of infl uence that is defi ned by their country 
and organizational affi liation, culture and 
personality can and do play important, if 
often subliminal, roles in shaping negotiation 
objectives and styles. If negotiators are 
unaware of these infl uences, they may miss 
valuable verbal and nonverbal cues, entrench 
their counterpart in intractable positions, 
or derail negotiations completely. However, 
negotiators should also take care not to 
stereotype their counterparts too broadly, as 
individuals necessarily represent unique views 
and exhibit highly personal behaviors.6 
To help relief practitioners improve their 
negotiation expertise, the Center for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies 
(CSRS) teamed with the US Institute 
for Peace (USIP) Professional Training 
Program to provide hands-on skills training. 
Negotiation Skills for Post-Confl ict Actors 
brought together representatives from 
NGOs, IGOs, government civilian agencies, 
and the US and foreign armed forces to 
discuss the civilian-military relationship and 
hone negotiation skills using self-assessment 
and role play in a series of increasingly 
complex scenarios.  This event, which was 
held May 20-23, 2007, at the Marina Dunes 
Resort in Marina, California, was CSRS’s 
most international to date, with participants 
from Afghanistan, Burundi, Mozambique, 
Norway, the Philippines, and Switzerland 
joining US actors. This program leveraged 
USIP’s proven curriculum for preparing 
practitioners for the complex negotiation 







Quinney, Nigel. US Negotiating Behavior. US Institute of Peace, 
October 2002, page 2.
According to the US Institute of Peace, four factors inﬂ uence 
negotiating behavior in any situation:
•  Structural factors, such as a country’s 
geographical situation and political system.
•  The national culture of negotiators.
•  The specifi c issues being negotiated.
•  The personalities of negotiators.
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Participants’ learning objectives for the 
event were to:
•  Enhance their understanding of – and 
professional network among – the other 
post-confl ict response communities.
•  Improve their cross-community and 
inter-organizational communications skills.
•  Understand the strengths and limitations 
of their confl ict management styles.
•  Expand their understanding and 
repertoire of negotiation/mediation 
skills and strategies.
•  Develop the capacity to build trust, 
identify shared objectives, and 
promote collaboration. 
CSRS was honored to welcome the new 
president of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Vice Admiral (Ret.) Dan Oliver, who was 
introduced by Lieutenant General (Ret.) 
Robert Ord, III, Dean of the School of 
International Graduate Studies. President 
Oliver stressed the importance of 
collaboration across communities. “Getting 
that collaboration right is diffi cult,” he 
acknowledged. “We have to work across 
languages, geographies, religions, and 
ethnic boundaries.” However, he said 
that communication was the beginning 
of understanding. It is in that spirit that 
we offer Negotiation Skills for Post-
Confl ict Actors, recognizing that improved 
communication and negotiation skills benefi t 
not just individual practitioners, but the 
relief community as a whole. We hope that 
workshop participants will use their new 
insights, skills, and professional networks to 
help eradicate post-confl ict countries’ ills and 
mitigate the suffering of its citizens. 
Matthew Vaccaro
Program Director
Participants mingle before 
the opening session.
Cultural Differences in 
Conﬂ ict Situations
Cynthia Irmer, a Confl ict Prevention 
Offi cer in the State Department’s Offi ce 
of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 
and Stabilization (S/CRS), described some 
of the common stereotypes of the State 
Department: No one is in charge and 
offi cials can’t make up their minds, yet still 
want to be in the center of things. She drew 
group laughter when she illustrated the 
sometimes tense relationship between State 
and the military with an anecdote: When 
invited to a State-sponsored simulation 
on how the US Government would aid an 
unstable state, a military offi cial responded: 
“Yes, we will be happy to participate in 
your kumbaya exercise.”
All joking aside, Irmer said that S/CRS 
was created to facilitate dialogue between 
different agencies and groups. She 
exhorted participants to examine the fi lters 
–  nationality, language, organizational 
affi liation –  through which they viewed 
other countries critically, drawing parallels 
to State offi cials’ ability to immerse 
themselves in the languages and countries 
where they are posted.  
The next speaker, Major John 
Fitzsimmons, a reserve officer with the 
US Marine Corps’ Golf Company, offered 
an infantryman’s perspectives of inter-
community stereotypes, taking pains to 
stress that he was not qualified to speak 
on behalf of either the Marine Corps or 
the US military. Seeking to shatter the 
relief community’s perspective of the 
military as a blood-thirsty squad of under-
skilled warriors, Fitzsimmons painted a 
picture of a foot-mobile, highly trained 
unit comprised of diverse individuals who 
work as doctors, attorneys, policemen, and 
businessmen in their civilian lives. Since 
the military deploys for short periods of 
time – two years at most – it is essential 
that officers on the ground build good 
relationships with NGO representatives 
to win the hearts and minds of the local 
populace. Unfortunately, when he was sent 
to Iraq, his unit didn’t achieve that goal. 
From his experience, NGOs that were 
co-located with troops didn’t respect the 
military’s rules, although they still sought 
its protection, increasing the tension 
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Panelists from each of the four principal communities involved in stabilization 
and reconstruction work –  NGOs, IGOs, civilian government agencies, and 
the armed forces –  presented the common cultural stereotypes others have 
about their organizations and how those generalities can hinder cooperation 
in the fi eld.
Noemi Rios, the former Senior Field 
Operations Manager of VEGA, offered 
a primer on NGOs, stressing their 
independence and neutrality and discussing 
the differences between how they operate. 
Some organizations are operational in 
nature, seeking funding and implementing 
programs, while others are campaign-
driven, building awareness for a cause. 
Common stereotypes about NGOs are that 
they lack accountability, transparency, and a 
democratic mandate; are staffed with young 
naïve personnel who may in fact be covert 
intelligence offi cials; and are defi antly anti-
global. Ms. Rios addressed each stereotype 
in turn, discussing the organizational 
structures and donor guidelines that focus 
each group’s work while creating strong 
accountability measures, and dismissing 
other charges. Additionally, she discussed 
how NGOs and the military can work 
cooperatively together, sharing an anecdote 
about her personal experience working 
with Jonathan Morgenstein, a Marine 
Corps reservist and US Institute of Peace 
program offi cer, helping women-owned 
businesses in Iraq. While the experience 
was very positive, Rios acknowledged 
that short military deployments and 
insuffi cient transition times can undo gains 
if knowledge and best practices are not 
transferred to new personnel. 
Representing the IGO community, Mario 
Lito Malanca, a Practice Manager for 
Crisis, Mitigation, and Recovery in the 
International Organization for Migration’s 
(IOM) Emergency and Post Crises Division 
spoke about his organization’s work with 
the military. With 120 member states, IOM 
is a global force in the fi eld of migration. 
IOM has established a unit to coordinate 
migration response activities with the 
military, NGOs, member states, and other 
groups. IOM has worked cooperatively 
with military forces since 1992, often 
viewing them as partners focused on a 
common goal. Malanca discussed how IOM 
has a memo of understanding with military 
forces and has worked side by side with the 
military in Mozambique, Angola, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, Serbia, and Montenegro. 
He stressed the military’s resources for 
dealing with large-scale emergencies such 
as a pandemic or natural disaster, like the 
Pakistan earthquake. Because the military 
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“My military brother has let me down,” said panelist Cynthia Irmer, 
joking. “State always blames DoD,” retorted fellow panelist 
Major John Fitzsimmons to much group laughter.
was able to deploy personnel in just two 
hours, forces were able to set up tents 
and provide food for earthquake victims, 
helping to minimize loss of life. 
CSRS Program Director Matthew Vaccaro 
contrasted the differences between the four 
communities represented by presenters. 
IGOs like IOM, he said, are typically 
mandate-driven and infl uenced by member 
state priorities. NGOs such as VEGA 
are driven by values or donor guidelines. 
Meanwhile, the military is mission-focused, 
seeking to accomplish a specifi c set of tasks 
that have been ordered from above. And 
fi nally, the State Department is process- and 
dialogue-driven, meaning that the journey is 
just as important as the destination.  
Members of the group discussed the 
challenges of interaction in post-confl ict 
environments. Confl ict, said Vaccaro, has 
a way of simplifying relationships since 
the military is the only community with 
weapons. However, scenarios like Iraq 
actually complicate relationships and work 
on the ground because forces are involved 
in ongoing confl ict as combatants. Several 
participants said that relational diffi culties 
are usually due to a lack of respect and 
understanding between parties. At a lower 
Purpose of Humanitarian 
Negotiation
Humanitarian negotiation is undertaken 
to achieve three critical objectives:
1)  Ensure the provision of humanitarian 
assistance and protection to 
vulnerable populations.
2)  Preserve humanitarian space.
3)  Promote better respect for 
international law.
From Humanitarian Negotiation with Armed 
Groups, United Nations, 5. 
level, this can create tension between 
groups, such as the issues Fitzsimmons and 
his unit experienced in Iraq with NGO 
members who did not respect hygiene 
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The new president of the 
Naval Postgraduate School, 
Vice Admiral (Ret.) Dan 
Oliver, greets  Apollinaire 
Ndayimirije, a police 
monitor with the African 
Union Mission in Sudan.
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mandates and military perimeters, but 
still wanted security services. At a higher 
level, it can lead to communication cutoffs 
and hostility. An NGO member said that 
sharing space is necessarily contentious as 
it erodes the impartiality of humanitarian 
relief providers. French NGOs in particular, 
he said “are paranoid about the 
‘instrumentalization’ of NGOs, but 
many say the fi ght is already lost.”
Said a military participant: “If one 
community doesn’t respect another and 
their capabilities, members withdraw. We 
saw that at the workshop today in the 
dining room. There were very few mixed 
tables; most people ate with their own 
community.” If barriers exist in everyday 
life, how can actors optimize cooperation in 
post-confl ict environments? Malanca said 
IOM’s successes can provide a roadmap. 
In Kosovo, the relief community created a 
Joint Implementation Commission to handle 
issues on both a national and provincial level. 
This two-pronged strategy allowed actors 
to implement a common approach to relief 
work and handle community issues at the 
local level, preventing them from escalating 
to national problems. A government agency 
representative cautioned against comparing 
Kosovo (where there were clear role divisions 
between players and a relatively secure 
environment) to Afghanistan and Iraq, where 
military forces have been providing relief as 
well as security. “We’ve seen a real blurring of 
the lines,” he said.
At left: Workshop participants enjoy the opportunity to talk with other 
relief actors during a meal break.
At right: Panelist Cynthia Irmer, a Conﬂ ict Resolution Specialist with 
S/CRS, speaks with Ed Salazar, a Diplomatic Strategy Ofﬁ cer in S/CRS.
9How do people negotiate? And what 
informs their decisions? To help participants 
understand their personal negotiation 
styles, workshop facilitator Nina Sughrue 
had them complete the Thomas-Killman 
Confl ict Mode Instrument,7 one of the 
world’s most well-known and widely 
used  tools for confl ict resolution. While 
participants typically possessed attributes 
of all fi ve confl ict styles – competitor, 
avoider, compromiser, accommodator, 
and collaborator – they had a dominant 
style that unconsciously infl uenced their 
negotiation choices. By gaining insights into 
different styles, participants are better able 
to understand the styles used by all parties 
at the negotiating table and adapt their own 
approach accordingly. Based on the results of 
the self-administered test, Ms. Sughrue asked 
participants to break into fi ve groups and 
discuss the major attributes of their primary 
approach to confl ict.  
Strengths and Weaknesses of 
Different Conﬂ ict Styles
As groups presented their confl ict styles, 
Ms. Sughrue pointed out that each group 
had stressed only the positive aspects of its 
confl ict style. Presenting a more balanced 
approach, she walked through the positive 
and negative attributes of each approach. 
Competing can be effective when your 
interests are at stake or you are under 
attack, but it can also antagonize your 
counterpart, she said. As a consequence, this 
approach can be detrimental to building 
long-term relationships. Americans are seen 
as competers at the negotiator table by their 
international counterparts, said Ms. Sughrue, 
echoing one of the key assertions of a United 
States Institute of Peace report on this issue, 
U.S. Negotiating Behavior. 
Collaborating gives parties time to explore 
options and create win-win solutions, but 
can be inappropriate when time is limited, 
issues are not signifi cant, or other parties are 
intractable. It is most helpful when parties 
are on the same side of a solution and are 
seeking to craft an elegant solution.  When 
people are not prepared to move forward, 
avoidance can be an effective strategy for 
buying adequate time for decision making. 
However, it can also escalate confl ict 
and extend it. People who live in confl ict 
Understanding and Optimizing 
Conﬂ ict and Negotiation Skills
How do people negotiate? And what informs their decisions? According to 
workshop facilitator Nina Sughrue, individuals have a dominant confl ict style that 
infl uences their negotiation choices. That style has both strengths and weaknesses, 
so it’s important to understand the ramifi cations of implementing certain confl ict 









Program Ofﬁ cer 
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Institute of Peace
situations are typically avoiders, said Ms. 
Sughrue, as they seek to limit their exposure 
to further suffering. 
Compromising works well when parties are 
equally committed and powerful and have 
a limited amount of time for negotiation; 
however, it may require making concessions 
that sacrifi ce key interests or short-circuit 
the ability to create a more effective solution 
through collaboration. Many senior military 
people are compromisers, said Sughrue, 
because they already possess power and thus 
don’t need to compete to win it. 
Accommodators give away key interests 
to build trust, but can lose more than they 
bargained for if relationships aren’t reciprocal 
or counterparts view them as weak. It is most 
appropriate when people are dealing with a 
negotiation that isn’t important or are seeking 
to build relationships with like-minded peers.  
In negotiations, parties often employ different 
confl ict styles, increasing the risk of creating 
unproductive results. If a competer and 
an avoider are paired, the negotiation will 
end quickly or stalemate. Meanwhile, two 
collaborators may spend excessive time 
creating an unworkable solution or may even 
generate multiple outcomes. 
While one style typically predominates, 
people possess all fi ve confl ict styles. As a 
consequence, individuals who exhibit one 
mode in professional situations may use 
another one in social relationships. Family 
relationships often turn people who typically 
address confl ict into avoiders, said Sughrue. 
The best negotiators are fl exible and use all 
fi ve modes, adapting their approach to meet 
the needs of each situation and optimizing 
their probability of a successful outcome. 
The Odin Negotiation: 
Practicing New Principles 
To put new insights into practice, the group 
split into two-person teams, assuming the roles 
of an oil executive and a local activist in the 
fi ctional city of Odin. While the two roles had 
seemingly exclusive positions, the exercise was 
carefully written to allow negotiators to fi nd 
middle ground. The MegaOil Odin Operations 
Director was to push for redesigning a 
historical building for company usage and 
building the tallest structure possible to 
maximize the profi tability of the project, while 
Cultural Differences in Conﬂ ict Situations10
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What is negotiation?
The United Nations deﬁ nes it as 
“a process of communication 
and relationship building 
undertaken with the objective 
of arriving at an agreed 
outcome around a particular 
set of issues, in situations 
where the parties are not in 
complete accord on those 
issues to begin with.”  
 Prepare by deﬁ ning interests and BATNAs, 
or the best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement, 8 for all parties.
 Set realistic, achievable goals.
 Focus on interests, rather
 than positions.
  Listen actively, seeking to understand 
before you persuade.
 Establish relationships by building trust 
and reciprocity.
Offer and obtain concessions.
Stay calm during impasses.
  Generate multiple options, brainstorming a 
wide range of ideas for future evaluation.
 Use leverage, by creating coalitions, using 
judicious warnings, and communicating 
messages of fairness.
 Get a written, public commitment, rather 
than just an agreement.
McHugh, Gerard and Manuel Bessler. 
Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed 
Groups: A Manual for Practitioners. 
United Nations, January 2006, 5.
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“Power is ﬂ uid. Just because you don’t have power doesn’t 
mean you are powerless. There are ways to build it.” Workshop 
Facilitator Nina Sughrue
the Old Town Association Chairman was to 
seek guarantees that MegaOil would preserve 
the architectural integrity of the building, 
minimize the number of new stories built, and 
provide reduced-rate housing for local citizens. 
Creating Win-Win Outcomes
Participants spent about an hour conducting 
the exercise. After returning to the larger 
group, participants discussed their solutions. 
Workshop facilitator Jonathan Morgenstein 
asked the different participants to share 
their interests, not their positions, stressing 
that positions are just a starting point. 
While participants may give up certain 
positions, they should not compromise on 
their core interests. 
Participants came up with different solutions 
for their negotiation. One group collaborated 
on the building redesign, while another 
compromised on an interior modernization 
that kept the architectural façade intact. Most 
were able to articulate their interests – profi t 
for MegaOil and historical preservation for 
OTA – and then work to create an effective 
compromise. As Morgenstein pointed out, the 
parties’ objectives were not incompatible and 
multiple outcomes were possible. 
“What happens when you pair two 
collaborators?” asked Nina Sughrue. 
“Peace on Earth,” quipped a civilian 
government agency representative to 
group laughter.
Regardless of how an individual deals 
with confl ict, it is important to note that in 
most situations the relationships between 
negotiators will extend far beyond the current 
confl ict.  This is true with family members, 
business partners or neighboring diplomats, 
and highlights the importance of using 
negotiation strategies that will create “win-
win” solutions, allowing each side to save 
face and thus create a lasting settlement.
Participants brainstormed 
characteristics of their 
conﬂ ict resolution styles. 
While participants only 
mentioned positive 
attributes of their style, 
workshop facilitator Nina 
Sughrue said that all conﬂ ict 
styles have both positive 































•  Commitment to 
resolution
Accommodators
•  Good listeners
•  Relationship-
oriented
•  Future success-
focused
•  Empathic
•  Solution- and 
outcome-oriented
Compromisers











•  Choose the right 
battles
Collaborators
•  Willingness 
to learn
•  Active listeners
•  Consensus-
builders
•  Seek shared 
goals
•  Identify essential 
elements
Mediators play a vital role in ending confl ict, says professor William W. Monning. 
These neutral third parties serve as facilitators, helping adversaries explore 
options and solutions they might not be prepared to discuss or offer to one another 
at the negotiating table. Because mediation is both neutral and voluntary, it is often 
an elegant solution to intractable confl ict. 
To help participants understand how 
to make the jump between academic 
knowledge and fieldwork, CSRS invited 
William W. Monning, a Professor of 
Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at the 
Monterey Institute of International Studies 
and a co-founder of Global Majority, 
a Monterey-based organization that 
promotes nonviolent conflict resolution 
education, mediation, and advocacy, to 
speak about mediation’s applicability and 
practical implementation in conflict zones. 
“How do you take what you have learned 
in classrooms, where there are sequential 
negotiations, and apply them on the 
ground, when there may be emergency or 
first-aid issues to solve?” asked Monning.
Good negotiators must overcome their 
human instincts, said Monning, adding: 
“We all have very bad human instincts 
– fear, mistrust, anger, ego – that interfere 
with good decision making and confl ict 
resolution.” Negotiators must learn how to 
put aside their mistrust and use new tools, 
such as alternative dispute resolution, to 
analyze problems and fi nd solutions 
to confl icts. 
Monning outlined the four different 
types of alternative dispute resolution: 
negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and 
litigation. (See graphic on next page.) 
Negotiation, the most informal, least 
expensive form of dispute resolution, is 
used by individuals in both professional 
and personal settings. It may take the 
form of ad hoc discussions between two 
colleagues; alternatively, negotiation 
may be a highly orchestrated event with 
multiple participants. With mediation, 
a neutral third party helps conflicting 
parties work towards an agreement 
they might not achieve on their own. 
The mediator has no decision making 
authority, serving instead as a facilitator. 
Mediation has been used successfully in 
countries such as South Africa, Angola, 
and Mozambique, when warring parties 
realize that they cannot achieve decisive 
victory through military means and are 
willing to consider a diplomatic resolution. 
Often this realization comes after years of 
conflict and much loss of life. Arbitration 
helps parties define the legal means and 
rules that will settle future conflict should 












Applying Mediation Skills in 
Conﬂ ict Zones
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decision making authority. Litigation is 
quite literally the court of last resort, as it 
is time-consuming, costly, and adversarial 
in nature. 
Because the mediation process is both 
neutral and voluntary, it offers an 
elegant solution to intractable conflict. 
Mediators work with both parties to 
gain their trust, explore options, and 
participate in designing solutions that 
they might not be prepared to discuss or 
offer to their adversaries. The mediator 
is a safe party who can be trusted with 
inside information and has no agenda 
or stake in the outcome. To optimize 
the success of the mediation process, a 
mediator will typically conduct extensive 
preparations. He or she will identify all 
issues, objectives, and decision makers, and 
communicate how the mediation process 
will progress. During the mediation, the 
mediator will try to keep discussions on 
track by using a variety of techniques 
including bringing the right decision 
makers to the table; buying time to 
evaluate solutions; and meeting one-on-
one with participants to discuss issues, 
test BATNAs, and shape solutions. Good 
mediators help participants move forward 
by generating multiple options for their 
consideration and tabling troublesome 
issues for later resolution. 
Participants discussed how negotiations 
aren’t linear constructs: In Japan, said 
Monning, the negotiating table is a 
formality. Key decisions have likely already 
been made, or will be discussed at the 
bar that night. Additionally, words aren’t 
always enough, and small courtesies can 
go a long way towards winning trust and 
building rapport. A military offi cer said that 
during a negotiation with Thai government 
offi cials, “his friend, Johnny Walker” helped 
overcome a stalemate so that his military 
doctors could enter Vietnam to treat 
cholera patients. Monning said that small 
gifts can be useful, but that negotiators 
should take care to avoid the appearance of 
bribing offi cials. 
Finally, participants discussed how 
organizational values and expectations 
can constrain negotiating styles. An NGO 














benevolent dictator” to gain respect and 
achieve certain objectives, but that this 
mode of negotiating would likely prove 
unacceptable to his superiors. Similarly, 
a military officer said that he will brief 
his superiors on his counterparts’ cultural 
attitudes, the negotiation’s objectives, and 
his desired negotiating style and strategy 
to make sure they are on board with his 
approach before sitting down at the table. 
To demonstrate what not to do, another 
officer showed participants a military 
video of a Colonel angrily berating an 
Arab sheik about a skirmish that had 
cost his unit the lives of several soldiers. 
During the course of the video, the Colonel 
turned down the sheik’s offer of instituting 
a crime watch and demanded that the 
sheik give him the names of possible 
perpetrators. The fallacy of this approach? 
The Colonel likely received worthless 
intelligence and damaged a critical 
relationship he might need to leverage at 
a future point. Additionally, he reinforced 
destructive stereotypes about how US 
military officials interact with local leaders 
overseas. The fallout from this hostile 
interrogation would likely be extensive, 
as the sheik shared the message of the 




If negotiations between two parties are 
complex, what happens when the number 
of players increases? That question 
undergirded the group’s next simulation, 
Perspectives on Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs), led by Nicholas Tomb, CSRS 
Program Coordinator. For this exercise, 
participants represented key players at a 
United Nations Offi ce for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) meeting 
in Geneva, Switzerland, called to discuss the 
relationship between PRTs and humanitarian 
organizations in Afghanistan. Participants 
were asked to explore the potential for 
coordination and information sharing 
among the groups, as well as discuss the 
security challenges faced by their particular 
organization. The representative from 
OCHA was assigned to serve as moderator. 
“Most wars end at the 
negotiating table,” says professor 
William Monning. “However, 
parties must realize that they 
will not win a decisive victory 
militarily to be ready to end 
conﬂ ict diplomatically.”
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Workshop facilitator Nina 
Sughrue stresses a point.
After breaking into fi ve groups, participants 
returned to share their fi ndings. Two groups 
decided to use OCHA as an intermediary 
for information sharing between the military 
and NGO communities. In the fi rst group, 
humanitarian relief providers were willing to 
share general information about their location 
and activities, while the second group’s 
providers gave much more detailed medical 
data to avoid duplication of efforts. The third 
group also used OCHA, but set up functional 
working groups to involve an NGO that 
didn’t want to cooperate too closely with 
the military. The fourth group agreed to a 
routine phone meeting, where all stakeholders 
would provide security-related information 
to optimize the safety and security of all relief 
providers. One NGO would provide e-mail 
updates only, to preserve its independence. 
And fi nally, the fi fth group decided to use the 
Afghan Ministry of the Interior to facilitate 
sharing information on NGO locations. 
None of the fi ve groups decided to involve 
NGOs in military planning, either because 
of the military’s refusal to share classifi ed 
information or because of NGOs’ reluctance 
to participate in an activity that would violate 
their mandate of neutrality. 
Participants introduce 
themselves at the 
opening session.
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How do you create a language for peace? 
What does reconciliation look like in a society 
scarred by years of violence and deep cultural 
divides? And what happens when theoretical 
constructs are tested by the harsh realities of 
real-life implementation? These important 
questions have guided Reverend Byron Bland 
in his work as a confl ict resolution practitioner 
who has sought to make the connection 
between peace theory and practice through 
his organization, the Stanford Center on 
International Confl ict and Negotiation; as the 
author of Getting Beyond Cheap Talk; and in 
his hands-on work in Northern Ireland with 
the group, Community Dialogue, founded by 
Irish activist Brian Lennon.
Complicated situations like Northern Ireland 
test negotiators’ skills to the utmost. Common 
techniques, such as those offered by the industry 
tome, Getting to Yes, don’t begin to address 
all the unasked questions, unresolved issues, 
and troubled relationships that can sabotage 
the peace process. To understand these issues, 
practitioners should conduct a barriers analysis 
to understand and assess the full set of tactical, 
strategic, structural, and psychological barriers 
that must be addressed.  Equally importantly, 
actors must defi ne what reconciliation 
really means. It’s certainly not interpersonal 
relationships writ large, which are fraught with 
peril even on an individual scale.
What Reconciliation Means
In her seminal work The Human Condition, 
Hannah Arendt said that human community 
ought to be impossible, since people interact 
in destructive ways and live in a sea of 
uncertainty. However, two critical human 
attributes – forgiveness for the past and hope 
for the future – enable people to reconcile. 
Witness the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’s important work after the 
African National Congress’s victory in South 
Africa. While most researchers have focused 
on forgiveness, Bland feels that the hope of a 
shared future is what allows warring parties 
to end strife and work towards reconciliation. 
Only by defi ning the future can people fi nd 
the strength and trust to deal with the past. 
For dialogue to be productive, it must be 
open, and it must address the individual’s 
place in the new peace. Community Dialogue 
sought to engage local citizens by asking three 
core questions: What do you want? Why do 






Stanford Center on 
International Conﬂ ict 
and Negotiation
To bring a real-life perspective to the group’s training, workshop facilitators invited 
a guest speaker, Reverend Byron Bland, to discuss his work in Northern Ireland. 
Bland has helped a grassroots organization, Community Dialogue, explore the 
social and political dynamics of reconciliation.
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you want it? And given that others disagree, 
what can you live with? 
Barriers to Cross-Cultural 
Understanding
According to Bland, there are three primary 
barriers to creating understanding between 
competing factions: naive realism, false 
polarization, and reactive devaluation. A 
naive realist believes that his view of the 
world captures the way it really is; anyone 
who doesn’t share his views or refuses to 
change has evil motives. If an opposing party 
does something good, it manifests his strategic 
or tactical understanding of the situation; 
on the other hand, the naive realist’s action 
refl ects the inherent goodness of his character. 
Bland says we see this perspective at work 
today in the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict. 
False polarization occurs when parties 
can’t see the ambivalence of the other side’s 
position and are blind to the common 
ground that they share. There is always more 
common ground than parties believe there is. 
To counteract false polarization, each party 
should articulate the strongest arguments 
for the opponent’s position to demonstrate 
that it understands the other side’s needs and 
desires. When the Unionists and Nationalists 
did this in Northern Ireland, they saw that the 
opposing side had an authentic perspective 
based on its set of experiences. Creating 
understanding is essential to moving beyond 
issue deadlock.  
Reactive devaluation occurs when one party 
diminishes the value of another’s offer. The 
recipient becomes suspicious, analyzing the 
offer to see if there is a trick involved and 
minimizes its worth. This makes the giver 
unhappy, because the concession involves 
real political cost. To prevent reactive 
devaluation, parties making concessions 
should explain why they are making an 
offer, why they are choosing this particular 
offer, and why the timing is signifi cant. In 
Northern Ireland, a Unionist offi cial devalued 
the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) offer to 
put weapons in caches, demanding that they 
surrender them instead. When confronted 
with the fl aw in his logic – the IRA could 
rearm at any time – the man relented and 
accepted the concession. 
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There are four critical problems that have to be addressed to create meaningful 
reconciliation between warring parties:  • The problem of a shared future   
• The problem of trustworthiness • The problem of loss   • The problem of 
just entitlements
 — Peace Studies Expert Reverend Byron Bland
The Four Peace Problems
As groups seek to develop a common 
understanding, they face four critical issues: 
the problem of a shared future, the problem 
of trustworthiness, the problem of loss, and 
the problem of just entitlements. 
At the simplest level, each side’s arguments 
about the future are cries for recognition: Is 
there a place for me in this new future? Since 
parties will necessarily sustain losses, they 
must fi nd them bearable enough that they 
won’t resort to violence, believing that they 
will continue to have status and a role in the 
new order. 
Creating trust is critical to building a shared 
future. Parties must believe that their interests 
are now intertwined and will be promoted 
jointly. One way to build trust is to specify 
open and closed arguments: which issues will 
be left open, and which ones must be resolved 
now. Weaker parties will typically seek to 
leave issues open to create future leverage. In 
Northern Ireland, the Nationalists wanted to 
let things unfold, while the Unionists wanted 
to nail them down.
Another strategy is to agree to cooperate, 
even though each side has different reasons 
for doing so. Groups might agree about 
the fi nal outcome, but disagree about 
the process, or vice versa, but use this 
commonality to move forward. The Israeli-
Hezbollah ceasefi re is an example of this 
strategy. However, agreeing on an interim 
step is only a temporary measure; groups 
must move forward or the peace process will 
inevitably break down, as there are no goals 
to achieve and no enforcement measures to 
ensure accountability. 
Validating Each Side’s Losses
Creating peace necessarily creates loss. One or 
more parties will give up gains and will typically 
perceive losses as greater than the other side’s. 
It’s a mistake to try and force parties to perceive 
their losses as equal, as each side believes the 
other has won all the important issues. Such a 
view aligns with behavioral science’s prospect 
theory, which fi nds that human beings value 
prospective losses much more than prospective 
gains. Consequently, the best approach is simply 
to get them to perceive the other side’s losses as 
authentic, said Bland. 
Pictured from left to right: 
Commander Timothy 
Clemente and Captain 
Joseph Contreras, both of 
the US Army’s 426th Civil 
Affairs Battalion, proceed 
to a breakout session. 
“No one asks the question: 
‘Is this a just peace?’ Instead 
they ask themselves: ‘Is this 
peace worth enduring?’” 
—  Reverend Byron Bland
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A Peace Worth Enduring
Because each side is typically losing 
something, both groups may feel that the 
new peace is unjust. Parties on each side will 
differ in their opinions of what a just peace 
constitutes; hence, creating common ground 
is futile. Instead, parties should work to 
lessen the impact of injustice on each side. 
No one asks the question: “Is this a just 
peace?” Instead they ask themselves: “Is this 
peace worth enduring?” In South Africa, 
Nelson Mandela was able to win multiple 
concessions from President Frederik Willem 
de Klerk (equal voting rights and political 
power for the ANC among them) and end 
apartheid because he painted a picture 
of a shared future for both Africans and 
Afrikaners. As such, he has achieved almost 
mythic status. When Bland spoke to an 
Israeli group of leaders, he was asked by one 
offi cial: “Where is our Palestinian Mandela?” 
Troubled by the question, Bland thought for 
a long time before discovering the answer: 
The Palestinian leader Israelis would be 
willing to lose to.
During the question and answer period, 
participants asked about how the model 
works with rogue nations as well as 
individuals who seek to derail the peace 
process, citing examples as various as North 
Korea, Spain’s Basque movement, the Israeli-
Palestinian confl ict, and the Sunni-Shiite 
schism in Iraq. Bland said that fi nding a 
shared future, or else creating interim steps 
toward one, can help bridge the gap with 
isolationists, while peace participants must 
police themselves to keep extremists 
from succeeding.
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At left: Workshop participants listen to facilitator Nina Sughrue (off-camera) explain the 
ﬁ ner points of negotiation.
At right: Nick Tomb, CSRS Program Coordinator, helps Major John Fitzsimmons 
prepare for his panel presentation.  
The event’s fi nal simulation offered a proving 
ground to practice new principles in the 
face of an escalating crisis. Participants 
were given a scenario: The fi ctional country 
of Meni, where a years-long civil war had 
recently escalated to a crisis point with the 
capture of NGO workers and much needed 
medical supplies. Failure to mediate peace 
between two warring factions would mean 
that thousands of internally displaced persons 
who desperately needed vaccination would 
perish in an impending smallpox epidemic.
Workshop facilitators created three subgroups 
and assigned participants roles as the 
president, rebel leader, multi-ethnic peace 
activists, UN Special Representative to the 
Secretary General, UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) Representative, 
and two NGO leaders. Each group was 
to promote its own agenda, while the 
UN Special Representative sought to 
achieve consensus and the UN’s objectives. 
Workshop facilitators urged groups to 
assess the negotiation for key principles they 
had learned during the sessions – confl ict 
styles, positions and interests, BATNAs, 
third parties, and cultural differences 
– and implement new skills. Participants 
were encouraged to build trust with their 
counterparts and use creativity to fi nd 
solutions. Groups were given three hours to 
complete the exercise.
When groups reconvened, they shared 
their fi ndings. One group created a clever 
strategy to solve one of the issues on the 
table – seized land – by putting it in trust 
for displaced farmers. A couple of others 
took their role playing to a new level, 
threatening to kill a local activist group 
or playing an NGO member as a religious 
zealot. Workshop facilitator Nina Sughrue 
commented that the scenarios played 
out differently than she had previously 
witnessed, due to the fact that groups 
aligned themselves ethnically. Participants 
said that the addition of a second Muslim 
NGO representative, which created an 
ethnic imbalance among NGO players, was 
responsible for escalating hostilities. As a 
consequence, groups had a more challenging 
time working towards an equitable solution 
that considered the interests of all players.
Towards a Safe Haven
For the event’s fi nal simulation, participants negotiated a crisis with no BATNA. 
Failure to mediate peace between two warring factions in the fi ctional country 
of Meni would mean thousands of internally displaced persons who desperately 
needed vaccination would perish in an impending smallpox epidemic.
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Negotiation Skills for Post-Confl ict Actors 
was designed to help relief actors refi ne 
negotiation skills and practice using them 
in scenarios that mimicked conditions they 
might experience in the fi eld. Participants 
learned about their personal confl ict styles 
and negotiation and mediation principles 
before executing a series of increasingly 
complex exercises that involved players 
with competing agendas, escalating crises, 
and third parties serving as mediators. To 
drive home learning objectives, participants 
assumed roles they would never play in the 
fi eld. This helped participants think creatively 
to serve the interests of their alter egos. 
Ideally, this type of challenging role play 
would also improve participants’ ability to 
assess the positions and interests of their 
counterparts in the fi eld.  
During the multi-day event, participants 
used all fi ve negotiation styles – competing, 
avoiding, accommodating, compromising, 
and collaborating – to help groups with 
opposing objectives focus on higher-level 
purposes and create successful outcomes. 
In the Odin exercise, participants realized 
that articulating real interests helped them 
fi nd common ground and create “win-win” 
agreements, while in the PRT exercise, they 
found that delineating cultural differences 
and information sharing objectives was 
instrumental in creating a model that would 
work for all participants. Finally, in the Meni 
simulation, participants used a wide array of 
strategies to execute a diffi cult scenario with 
no BATNA: holding preparatory meetings 
with a subset of participants, using short-
term concessions to leverage longer-term 
agreements, tabling non-urgent issues, and 
working around troublesome participants. 
With the lives of so many on the line, 
participants had to execute a successful 
negotiation. One participant played the role of 
a third party, helping warring factions agree on 
terms that would address their interests, while 
averting a humanitarian crisis.  The workshop 
also helped participants build relationships and 
expand their understanding of the larger relief 
community. Panelists described how others 
stereotype their organizations, and how those 
generalities misrepresent their communities, 
potentially short-circuiting cooperation with 
other relief providers. Meanwhile, presenters 
Conclusion
By providing teaching, scenario-driven role play, and networking opportunities, 
Negotiation Skills for Post-Confl ict Actors sought to give relief actors the 
negotiation mindset, insights, and strategies they need to be successful in the fi eld.
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Conclusion 23
William Monning and Byron Bland stressed 
the role of dialogue, creative problem solving, 
and third parties in helping warring groups 
acquire new insights about opponents, 
overcome entrenched positions, and work 
towards peace.
While divergent purposes and organizational 
cultures still separate NGOs, IGOs, 
government civilian agencies, and the armed 
forces, practitioners from all organizations 
increasingly see the value of working together 
in the fi eld. For this reason, relief actors 
value the opportunity to network at CSRS 
events, which provide a neutral venue for 
learning more about other communities 
and their expertise, developing professional 
relationships, and gaining insights and best 
practices for use in future fi eldwork.
Whether they’re sharing information 
with other actors to improve security or 
operational effi ciency, teaming on strategies 
to help host governments avert or stabilize 
crises, or collaborating internally to improve 
effectiveness, practitioners can use negotiation 
techniques to ensure that they and their 
organizations are successful in the fi eld.  
Negotiation Skills for Post-Confl ict Actors 
helped practitioners develop a toolkit to use 
in a wide array of circumstances to create 
successful outcomes and build careers as the 
next generation of relief leaders. 
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